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This paper studies the determinants of interest rate spreads of euro area 10 year government 
bonds against the benchmark, the German bund, after the introduction of the euro. In particular, it 
pays attention to the question whether market discipline is advanced or obstructed by financial 
integration and by fiscal rules like the Stability and Growth Pact. We first argue that financial 
integration – by improving market efficiency – is instrumental for markets to exert their 
disciplinary role. Next, we discuss the relationships between market discipline and fiscal rules, 
arguing that these in principle may reinforce each other. Finally, we provide strong empirical 
evidence that spreads depend on the ratings of the underlying bond and to a large extent are 
driven by the level of short-term interest rates.  
 
Keywords: Bond spreads; credit risk; liquidity risk. 
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Non-technical summary 
Interest rate spreads of euro area 10-year government bonds against the German Bund have 
reached historically low levels since 1999, despite many countries facing increasing deficits and 
debt. The lack of market reactions in the wake of these adverse fiscal developments has prompted 
people to argue that the euro and the ongoing process of financial integration have eliminated 
markets’ ability or willingness to discriminate the creditworthiness of national fiscal policies.   
This paper studies the determinants of euro area government bond spreads, exploring the links 
between market discipline, financial integration and fiscal rules. In particular, it pays attention to 
the question whether market discipline is advanced or obstructed by financial integration and by 
fiscal rules like the Stability and Growth Pact.  
We first provide theoretical arguments that financial integration – by improving market efficiency 
– is instrumental for financial markets to provide an accurate assessment of the risk-return profile 
of government bonds. Accurate asset pricing implies that governments pursuing unsound fiscal 
policies will be forced to offer higher yields to attract risk-averse investors, in order to 
compensate them for the higher default risk. Via this channel, progress in financial integration 
will ultimately reinforce any market-driven disciplinary effect. 
Next, we discuss the relationships between market discipline and fiscal rules, arguing that these in 
principle may reinforce each other. Negative re-assessments by financial markets are reflected in 
a higher interest burden for governments, which could induce steps in the excessive deficit 
procedure. At the same time and more importantly, fiscal rules increase awareness of adverse 
fiscal developments, provide guidance to financial markets, and lead to more transparent fiscal 
accounts. The combined effect of market and regulatory sanctions puts pressure on governments 
to promote sound fiscal policies. 
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Finally, we provide empirical evidence on the determinants of interest rate spreads in euro area 
government bond markets. A robust finding of the literature is that spreads since 1999 are driven 
by a common factor, which appears to be related to the spread of corporate debt over government 
debt. However, the literature remains evasive about why the common factor is best measured by 
corporate spreads.  
With a fixed-effects panel regression, we find evidence of strong co-movements between spreads 
on one side, and short term interest rates and credit ratings on the other side. In addition, we find 
robust evidence that not only government bond spreads, but also spreads between corporate and 
government bonds tend to be proportional to the level of short-term interest rates.  
The fact that interest rates are strongly correlated not only to government bond spreads, but also 
to the spreads between corporate and government bonds (both in the euro area and the US), 
suggests that the main driver of these spreads is the level of short term interest rates (rather than 
spreads between corporate and government bonds). The strong correlation between spreads and 
short term interest rates may be explained by the compensation structure of investment managers. 
When interest rates are low, investors have greater incentives to take on risk, in order to improve 
the expected return on their investment. If investors increasingly take on more liquidity and credit 
risks in the government bond market when interest rates are low, spreads will be compressed, thus 
generating a positive correlation between interest rates and spreads. Our estimates show that 
sovereigns with worse fiscal positions are forced to pay a substantial credit risk premium, 
suggesting that market discipline is still working in the euro area government bond market.  
6
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  1.  Introduction 
In the run-up to the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), interest rate spreads of 
euro area 10 year government bonds against the benchmark, the German bund, have declined 
dramatically. Although there is almost unanimous agreement that these developments mainly 
reflected the introduction of the euro and the removal of exchange rate risks, the puzzling fact is 
that spreads continued to decline even after 1999. While at the beginning of EMU, euro area 
government fiscal positions improved against the background of a favourable macroeconomic 
climate, the most recent years have seen many countries breaking the rules of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, facing the excessive deficit procedure for a prolonged period. The lack of a strong 
market reaction in the wake of these adverse fiscal developments has prompted people to argue 
that the euro and the ongoing process of financial integration have eliminated markets’ ability or 
willingness to discriminate the quality of national fiscal policies.   
This paper studies the determinants of euro area government bond spreads, exploring the links 
between market discipline, financial integration and fiscal rules. In particular, it pays attention to 
the question whether market discipline is advanced or obstructed by financial integration and by 
fiscal rules like the Stability and Growth Pact.  
We first provide theoretical arguments that financial integration – by improving market efficiency 
– is instrumental for financial markets to provide an accurate assessment of the risk-return profile 
of government bonds. Accurate asset pricing implies that governments pursuing unsound fiscal 
policies will be forced to offer higher yields to attract risk-averse investors, in order to 
compensate them for the higher default risk. Via this channel, progress in financial integration 
will ultimately reinforce any market-driven disciplinary effect. 
7
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Next, we discuss the relationships between market discipline and fiscal rules, arguing that these in 
principle may reinforce each other. Negative re-assessments by financial markets are reflected in 
a higher interest burden for governments, which could induce steps in the excessive deficit 
procedure. At the same time and more importantly, fiscal rules increase awareness of adverse 
fiscal developments, provide guidance to financial markets, and lead to more transparent fiscal 
accounts. The combined effect of market and regulatory sanctions will put pressure on 
governments to promote sound fiscal policies. 
Finally, we provide empirical evidence on the determinants of interest rate spreads in euro area 
government bond markets. A robust finding of the literature is that spreads under EMU are driven 
by a common factor (see, for example, Codogno et al. 2003, Favero et al. 2005, Geyer et al. 
2004). There is some evidence that this common factor is related to the spread of corporate debt 
over government debt. However, the literature remains evasive about why the common factor is 
best measured by corporate spreads.  
With a fixed-effects panel regression, we find evidence of strong co-movements between spreads 
on one side, and short term interest rates and credit ratings on the other side. In addition, we find 
robust evidence that not only government bond spreads, but also spreads between corporate and 
government bonds tend to be proportional to the level of short-term interest rates.  
The fact that interest rates are strongly correlated not only to government bond spreads, but also 
to the spreads between corporate and government bonds (both in the euro area and the US), 
suggests that the main driver of these spreads is the level of short term interest rates (rather than 
spreads between corporate and government bonds, as suggested for example by Codogno et al. 
2003). One economic rationale behind the strong correlation between spreads and short term 
interest rates may lie in the compensation structure of investment managers, as recently suggested 
by Rajan (2005). When interest rates are low, investors have greater incentives to take on risk, in 
8
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order to improve the expected return on their investment. If investors increasingly take on more 
liquidity and credit risks in the government bond market when interest rates are low, spreads will 
be compressed, thus generating a positive correlation between interest rates and spreads. 
Our estimates show that sovereigns with worse fiscal positions are forced to pay a substantial 
credit risk premium. Given the large debt-to-GDP ratios of most euro area countries, even small 
spreads of a few basis points turn out to be relevant. We perform a series of robustness checks – 
by looking at Credit Default Swaps, as well as euro area and US corporate bonds – which give 
comparable estimates of the credit risk premium. We also find evidence of a significantly positive 
liquidity risk premium, which suggests that there is further scope for financial integration in the 
euro area government bond market (to the extent, at least, that the elimination of these premiums 
does not collide with legal requirements such as the “no bail-out clause”). 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we define the concepts of market discipline 
and financial integration, discussing the links between the two. In section 3, we discuss the 
conditions for market discipline and the interaction between market discipline and fiscal rules. In 
section 4, we estimate a model on post-1998 data to disentangle the credit and liquidity risk 
components of the spreads in the euro area government bond market. We also provide a series of 
robustness checks which give further support to our findings. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Financial integration and market discipline 
Market discipline in the context of sovereign bond markets may be broadly defined as the 
influence exerted by market participants on governments by pricing different risks of default. 
Bonds of governments following unsound fiscal policies are characterized by higher risks. Risk-
averse investors want to be compensated for bearing such extra risk and therefore demand higher 
9
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yields. Governments have to take into account these higher financing costs when planning their 
fiscal policies. Ceteris paribus, market discipline provides a deterrent against unsound fiscal 
policies, and thus supports fiscal discipline.  
Market discipline is most effective in competitive and well-functioning markets. A necessary 
condition for financial markets to price sovereign bonds correctly is that governments have access 
to the capital markets on the same terms as other borrowers, and in particular that each country 
will ultimately bear the full financial consequences of a future default. Any direct or indirect 
pressure to favour government debt securities would inevitably introduce pricing distortions, thus 
impairing the role of markets as a disciplinary device. The Maastricht Treaty explicitly recognizes 
the importance of these issues in articles 101-103 (also see section 3). 
The market for a given instrument may be considered fully integrated if all agents with the same 
relevant characteristics face a single set of rules, have equal access and are treated equally.
1 By 
eliminating barriers to trade and creating a true level-playing field, progress in financial 
integration increases the efficiency of financial markets. Efficient financial markets, in turn, 
provide a more accurate assessment of the risk/return profile of each bond. Therefore, financial 
integration reinforces market discipline, by enhancing the capacity of the markets to accurately 
price assets. 
One argument that is sometimes used to show that the process of financial integration may be 
detrimental to the functioning of market discipline is the convergence in euro area government 
bond spreads that occurred in the run-up to the EMU and shortly after. This convergence occurred 
despite the deterioration of some euro area government fiscal positions. As before the monetary 
union large deficits were generally associated with sizeable spreads, people argue that the euro 
may have eliminated the capacity of bond markets to discriminate between the qualities of fiscal 
                                                 
1 See Baele et al. (2004) for a more formal definition of financial integration. 
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policies. The strongest version of the criticism states that the EMU and the Stability and Growth 
Pact eliminated the necessity to discriminate between different euro area sovereign bonds.  
This line of reasoning neglects the fact that spread convergence mainly reflects the progressive 
elimination of uncertainty about exchange rate movements before EMU, closer coordination of 
monetary policies across euro area countries before EMU and a single monetary policy since 
then, and an overall compression of risk premiums also observable in other markets and outside 
the euro area. 
In theory, the spread between two assets with the same cash flow should be zero only if the 
underlying bonds have identical risk-return characteristics. Typically, however, spreads between 
government bonds reflect three types of risks: 
1.  Exchange rate risk, which refers to the risk for investors of an adverse exchange rate 
movement (which in turn could be linked to inflation differentials, credibility of monetary 
policies, as well as sustainability of fiscal positions); 
2.  Liquidity risk, which refers to the risk of selling less liquid assets at worse market 
conditions (higher transaction costs, greater price impact) than more liquid ones; 
3.  Credit or default risk, which refers to the risk of default of the issuer, who may no longer 
be able to pay interests and/or pay back the capital, and which is mainly linked to the 
sustainability of fiscal positions. 
In addition, other technical factors (such as differences in taxation, or in the issuance, clearing 
and settlement procedures) may contribute to generate positive spreads. 
These risks are generally affected by both monetary and fiscal policies of each country. Exchange 
rate risks, in particular, are affected by inflation expectations. The years preceding the 
11
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introduction of the euro have been characterized by convergence in inflation rates and 
coordination of monetary policies across euro area countries. These factors, coupled with the 
progressive reduction in uncertainty about exchange rate fluctuations, have arguably been the 
main drivers behind the impressive convergence of government bond spreads in the run-up to the 
EMU. 
In principle, governments pursuing lax fiscal policies and having high debt levels may exert 
pressures on monetary authorities to reduce the real value of the debt by creating higher inflation. 
Rational agents would therefore demand higher yields in compensation of inflation and exchange 
rate depreciations induced by future monetization of the debt. The elimination of the risk 
premium associated to the lack of credibility of national monetary policies has certainly reduced 
the financing costs for the less virtuous Member States. To the extent that part of the eliminated 
risk premium was related to fiscal developments, one may argue that market discipline has indeed 
become less constraining for some governments after 1999. However, this reflects the elimination 
of a potential source of risk, rather than the effect of the ongoing process of financial integration. 
 
3.  Market discipline and fiscal rules 
The economic literature points towards a number of conditions that are deemed necessary for 
market discipline to work (Lane, 1992): 
•  Information provision. The requirement to disclose sound statistical information on a regular 
basis provides markets with timely and standardised fiscal information. 
•  Prohibition of monetary financing of government deficits. This prohibition closes off the 
monetary way out of fiscal problems.  
12
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•  No privileged access of governments to financial institutions. This rule forces governments to 
enter the capital market on broadly similar conditions as other borrowers.
2 
•  No bail-out clause. A debt-takeover by another institution would increase the expected 
recovery rate and reduce the default risk premium. 
However, even if these conditions are in place and credible, the market mechanism may be 
insufficient to guarantee fiscal discipline because “the constraints imposed by market forces 
might either be too slow and weak or too sudden and disruptive” (Delors-report, 1989), due to the 
often non-linear nature of market reactions. Furthermore, high bond supply by one country in a 
monetary union could spill-over to interest rates of other euro area participants given the common 
pool of financial resources (see, for instance, Detken, Gaspar and Winkler, 2004). On this ground, 
the Maastricht Treaty adopted an encompassing approach, including various safeguards to attain 
and maintain sound public finances. Next to rules aimed at enhancing market discipline (such as 
the prohibition of monetary financing of public institutions and of privileged access, the no bail-
out clause), the Treaty introduced ceilings on the government deficits (3% of GDP) and debt 
(60% of GDP). 
There are some key differences in the way market discipline and fiscal rules operate. Financial 
markets assess budgetary developments with an eye to financial rewards and risks, notably the 
credit risk premium, with horizons typically shorter than a few years. A deficit above 3% of GDP 
will not by itself cause major market reactions as it does not immediately affect fiscal 
sustainability and credit risk. In view of very low default risks over a horizon of a few years, and 
assessing the costs and benefits involved, markets have little incentives to make in-depth analyses 
                                                 
2 It should be noted that some government regulations may lead financial participants to prefer securities of (domestic) 
government, such as the capital adequacy rules, placing zero risk-weight on euro area government bonds at current 
ratings (compared to at least a 20% weight on corporate bonds), and exempting government bonds from the large-
exposure rule. Supervisory regulation thus may implicitly favour purchases of government bonds. The same effect 
may stem from supervisory and accounting reforms for pension funds and insurance companies: a move to market-
to-market valuation induces these investors to seek assets of long maturity to reduce a duration mismatch. 
Government bonds of (very) long-term maturity are a natural candidate for this demand. 
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of fiscal positions. The fiscal rules in place, on the other hand, have the explicit goal of containing 
government deficits and debt, with a view to not-hindering monetary policy, avoiding interest-
rate spill-overs and preventing a testing of the no bail-out clause.  
Another aspect on which market discipline and fiscal rules can be compared is their deterrent 
(In % of GDP) 
Sanction type  Stability and Growth Pact:  
deposit / fine                            
Current interest rate spreads 
(±30 basis points) 
Budgetary impact  0.01-0.02% of GDP  /          
0.21-0.52% of GDP 
0.05% of GDP per year 
 
Non-compliance with the excessive-deficit procedure can lead to a non-interest bearing deposit 
(article 104(9)), made up of a fixed sum (0.2% of GDP), and a supplement (0.1% of GDP for 
every percentage point by which the budget deficit exceeds 3% of GDP), with a total maximum 
of 0.5% of GDP. The budgetary costs of a deposit are equal to the interest rate the government 
has to pay on the amount to be deposited. In the current financial environment, a deposit would 
annually deteriorate the national budget by around 0.01% of GDP. Continued non-compliance 
may lead to transformation of the deposit into a non-interest bearing fine after two years, costing 
a government between 0.21% of GDP and 0.52% of GDP. New sanctions will be imposed in case 
of continued non-compliance, only consisting of the variable supplement, up to 0.5% of GDP per 
year. Such sanctions therefore could add-up over time.     
Financial markets, on the other hand, impose interest rate spreads of about 30 basis points in 
Greece and Italy – the two countries with currently the largest spreads. This implies additional 
14
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Table 1. Budgetary costs of rules- and market-based ‘sanctions’  
financial effect. Table 1 presents a comparison of the budgetary costs potentially involved.                                      
interest spending of about 0.05% of GDP per year on the basis of rules-of-thumb calculations, not 
taking into account any second-order effects.
 3  
In interpreting these numbers, it must be noted that they compare costs of potential future 
sanctions if they are applied (fiscal rules) with current yield spreads (market discipline). 
Furthermore, persistent excessive deficits in a country at some point will also negatively affect 
the interest rate spread and the rating, which would increase interest payment costs closer to or 
even above the costs of sanctions related to the excessive deficit procedure.  
Market discipline and fiscal rules do not operate in isolation but interact and may reinforce each 
other. As to the effects from market signals to fiscal rules, changes in interest rates following a 
higher credit risk premium affect government fiscal positions, usually with a negative sign. This 
increases chances of non-compliance with minimal consolidation efforts and of breaking the 3% 
limit, bringing forward the moment the corrective mechanisms of the Pact start operating, and 
thus the operation of fiscal rules.
4  
As to the effects in the other direction, rules give guidance to markets for monitoring fiscal 
developments, providing a “common language” for investors (Mosley, 2003). Publicity around 
cases of excessive deficit procedures increases market awareness of undue fiscal developments. 
Continued non-compliance with Council recommendations could also be seen as raising the small 
probability of the country exiting EMU, which would lift default risks and market rates.
5 Another 
effect is that assessing compliance with the fiscal rules brings forward more timely and 
comprehensive fiscal data, facilitating market monitoring. Reports by investment banks and credit 
rating agencies generally underline the importance of the Pact.
 Contrary to this, a strong belief in 
                                                 
3 With debt ratios around 110% of GDP and an average maturity around 61⁄2 years, some annual refinancing is around 
17% of GDP. A 1 percent-point higher interest rate then would translate into a 0.17% of GDP higher interest bill. 
4  Bayoumi et al. (1995) proposed increasing the role of market forces in fiscal rules, for instance by using interest rates 
rather than budgetary data for triggering non-compliance procedures or for determining the size of sanctions 
5   Empirical evidence of non-compliance with fiscal rules and interest rate responses is mixed, as for instance shown 
by Afonso and Strauch (2004). 
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the deterrent and correcting effect of the Pact might reduce monitoring by financial markets of 
fiscal developments if market participants are confident that peer pressure and sanctions will lead 
governments to reduce budgetary positions to below the deficit and debt reference values.
6 In 
such case, any excess over 3% of GDP would be considered only a temporary matter, not giving 
rise to major concerns on financial markets. Highly credible fiscal rules therefore indeed may 
reduce market discipline, but in such case there will also be less need for financial markets to 
react.  
 
4. Quantifying liquidity and credit risk premiums 
This section aims at decomposing interest rate spreads on European government bonds into its 
main remaining components, liquidity and default risk premiums. Such decomposition is 
important from a policy perspective. Significant default risk premiums may be the result of 
market disciplinary forces, and therefore call for improvements in the sustainability of public 
finances. Large liquidity premiums, on the other hand, may be a symptom of market 
fragmentation and require policies aimed at fostering the ongoing integration process.  
The existing literature on euro area government bond spreads employs different methodologies, 
as well as different countries and time-spans. Most studies include some pre-EMU years, to have 
a sample size sufficiently large to carry out meaningful econometric analyses (Codogno, Favero 
taking into account the additional exchange rate risk component of interest rate spreads, for the 
period before 1999. A common approach is to deduct from the interest rate spreads the difference 
                                                 
6  Poterba and Rueben (2001) report evidence for US States that tight anti-deficit rules lead to smaller interest rate 
increases in case of unexpected deficits than in States without such fiscal rules.  
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between 10-year swaps in the currency of the country and the DM as a measure of the exchange 
and Missale 2003, Bernoth, von Hagen and Schuknecht 2004, Gomez-Puig 2006). This requires                                     
rate related premium. An alternative is to compare yields on bonds issued by different 
governments in the same currency, e.g. DM/euro or US dollars.  
From the methodological point of view, Geyer, Kossmeier and Pichler (2004) and Menkveld, 
Favero, Pagano and von Thadden (2005) relate changes in spreads to changes in international risk 
factors. A common finding of these studies is that default risk premiums remain an important 
component of euro area government bond spreads even after the introduction of the single 
currency. Furthermore, there is consistent evidence of the existence of a common factor driving 
the spreads after 1999, which is related by Codogno et al. (2003) to the spreads of corporate 
bonds over government bonds in the United States. They interpret changes in these corporate 
spreads as changes in the international risk factors, but it remains unclear what is driving these 
changes.  
In fact, spreads in the euro area government bond market – and risk factors in general – are likely 
to be related to the level of short term interest rates, since the lower the rate of return on risk free 
assets, the higher the incentives for investors to boost their returns by taking on more risk. A 
compelling argument linking interest rates, investors’ incentives and risk premiums is provided 
by Rajan (2006).  He argues that the compensation structure of investment managers may induce 
investors to search for higher yields when interest rates are low. To see how these incentives 
operate, consider the typical compensation contract for a hedge fund manager. The manager earns 
2% of the value of the assets under management, plus a percentage of the annual returns on the 
investment. When interest rates are high, compensation will be high even investing in risk free 
assets. On the other hand, when interest rates are low, managers will have the incentive to take on 
more risk, because they can boost their compensation by increasing the expected return on their 
investment. Euro area government bond markets constitute an ideal environment to test this 
hypothesis, because investors may take on more risk by simply shifting their investment towards 
17
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Cheung and De Jong (2004) use factor models, while Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003) and                                     
less liquid or lower rated bonds. If investors consistently follow this behaviour, low interest rates 
will determine an overall compression of spreads, thus generating a positive correlation between 
interest rates and spreads. Hence, a low level of interest rates may in itself result in a convergence 
of spreads, based purely on risk-return considerations.
7 
At the same time, it is reasonable to expect that – ceteris paribus – governments implementing 
unsound fiscal policies are forced to pay higher spreads. The reason is that these governments 
face higher risks of default and investors need to be compensated for bearing such extra risk. It is 
important to stress that it is mainly the long-term sustainability of public finances (as opposed to 
short-term budget deficit fluctuations) that affects the probability of default and therefore 
accounts for the credit risk premium. A natural proxy for such long-term sustainability is given by 
the assessments provided by the leading rating agencies.
8 These ratings are more forward looking 
than simple debt- or deficit-to-GDP ratios, as they take into account not only the current level of 
debts and deficits, but also their expected development, as well as factors such as the quality of 
the budget law, the political stability of the country and other possibly relevant factors.
9 
On the basis of these arguments, one should expect government bond spreads to be positively 
related to the general level of interest rates and to the credit rating. Figure 1 confirms this 
intuition. We plot the ECB main refinancing operation minimum bid rate (MRO) together with 
monthly average spreads over the 10 year German government bonds for four differently rated 
bonds: the French (which is rated AAA), the Belgian (rated AA+), the Italian (initially rated AA 
and in July 2004 downgraded to AA-) and the Greek government bond (rated A).
10 The figure 
                                                 
7 In principle, this search for higher yield could also affect other financial markets like equity or real estate. However, 
in these markets it is more difficult to isolate the different sources of risk. 
8 Ratings have been extensively used in the literature. See, for instance, Gomez-Puiz (2006) for an application in the  
context of European government bond markets. Sironi (2004) uses ratings to test for market discipline in the  
European banking industry. 
9  See Afonso et al. (2007) for a recent empirical analysis indicating many variables affecting the rating, among which 
fiscal variables. 
10 We start the time series for Greece at the time it entered the euro area (January 2001). 
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shows that spreads are positively related to the interest rate level, with the best-rated bonds 
(French) offering the lowest spreads, and the lowest-rated bonds (Italian and Greek) the highest.
11  
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which report the correlation coefficients between the individual spreads and MRO, as well as 
has to pay on its debt. 
                                                 
11 An additional factor that may explain the recent reduction in spreads could be a decrease in the rank of the German 
benchmark bonds. Data on Credit Default Swap rates, for instance, suggest that the default risk of German bonds 
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The visual impression of figure 1 is confirmed for all countries by the results of tables 2 and 3, 
average spreads. Table 2 shows that there is a very strong correlation between spreads and MRO. 
Table 3 clearly illustrates that the lower the rating of a country, the higher the average spread it                                     
  AT BE ES  FI  FR GR IE  IT NL PT 
MRO  0.84 0.87 0.85 0.73 0.76 0.93 0.77 0.84 0.70 0.83 
 
  AT BE ES  FI  FR GR IE  IT NL PT 
Mean  16  20  16  14 9 30  13  26 9 21 
AAA  AA+  AAA  AAA  AAA  A  AAA  AA-  AAA  AA- 
 
We disentangle credit and liquidity risk premiums via a panel regression, controlling for the 
general interest rate level, credit ratings and country fixed effects: 
(1)  t c t c t
A
t c A t
AA




t c s ,  denotes the spread at time t of a 10-year government bond in country c relative to 
the German 10 year government bond yield 
c β  is a country fixed effect coefficient 




t c D D , , ,..., +  are the rating dummies for country c at time t (the ratings in the sample 
are AA+, AA, AA-, A+ and A while AAA is used as reference; the source is 
Standard&Poor’s) 








Table 3 – Average spreads of 10 year government bond yields (basis points), Jan.1999-May 2006 
Table 2 – Correlations between spreads of 10 year government bond yields and MRO, Jan. 1999-May 2006                                     
Liquidity risk premiums are identified via AAA non benchmark bonds: since these bonds have 
the same credit risk as the German ones, their spreads should contain no additional credit risk 
premium. We introduce the variable  t c Size ,  to control for potential liquidity effects due to the 
different sizes of government debts. The country fixed effect coefficient  c β  may capture other 
technical factors driving spreads, such as differences in taxation regimes or issuance procedures. 
Credit risk premiums, on the other hand, are identified via the rating dummies, and are measured 
by how much – in addition to the liquidity premium – countries with lower ratings need to pay to 
attract risk averse investors.
12 
We used monthly average spreads from January 1999 to May 2006, for on-the-run 10 year 
government bonds. The data were downloaded from the BIS data base. For Greece we included 
data starting from January 2001, when it entered the euro. We excluded Luxemburg from the 
analysis because its yields have an erratic behaviour.
13 
option in EViews, which is robust to both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity.  















(1.36)  0.77 
 
The relative high R
2 signals that the above model specification is able to explain most of the 
spread variability. We notice that all the coefficients are highly statistically significant, with the 
exception of the relative debt size. Since the relative debt size is changing very slowly from one 
                                                 
12  Enodogeneity should not be a problem here as rating agencies take into account a broad range of factors when 
making up the credit rating for a country. Furthermore, the medium-term orientation of ratings should reduce any 
impact of current interest rates on ratings. 
13 This reflects the low government gross debt ratio in Luxembourg, standing at around 7% of GDP. 
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Table 4 - Regression coefficient estimates 
The results are reported in table 4. We computed robust standard errors using the “White period”                                     
year to the next, most of the information contained in this variable comes from the cross section 
variation, which is already taken into account by the fixed effect coefficients.  
the rating dummies are all monotonically increasing, consistently with the economic intuition that 
lower rated governments should pay higher interest rates to compensate risk averse investors for 
the higher risk of default. The only exception is the coefficient associated to the A+ rating 
dummy whose estimate is slightly lower than the coefficient associated to the AA- rating dummy 
(although the difference is not statistically significant). This may partly be due to the fact that 
ratings are not perfect measures of the true risk of default, or to the noise introduced by the yields 
of the small issuers, which tend to exhibit a more erratic behaviour. Given the extremely low 
market share of these countries, they are likely to be more subject to country specific 
supply/demand factors that may bias the analysis. 
 
We therefore re-estimated the model, dropping the size variable (which turned out to be 
insignificant) and eliminating three small issuer countries, all AAA-rated: Austria, Finland and 
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A second interesting feature of the results reported in table 4 is that the coefficients associated to 
Ireland. The new results are reported in table 5: 
Table 5 - Regression coefficient estimates without small issuers                                     
small issuers results in more conservative estimates of the coefficient associated to t MRO , and 
higher estimates of the coefficients associated to the rating dummies.
14  
 
An estimate of the liquidity premium is given by: 
t AAA t MRO LP ⋅ =γˆ
^
 
where the hat denotes the estimated coefficient. This estimate quantifies the extra interest rate that 
governments with AAA rating have to pay with respect to Germany.    
The coefficients associated to the rating dummies provide an estimate of the credit risk premium, 
that is, how much – in addition to the liquidity risk premium – each country has to pay for having 
a lower rating than Germany: 
(3)  } , , , , {           ˆ
^
A A AA AA AA R MRO CP t R t + − + ∈ ⋅ =γ  
For instance, everything else equal, a deterioration of the rating from AAA to AA+ would have 
an additional cost for euro area governments of 4.5% of the MRO (coefficient  + AA γ  in the table). 
Deterioration from AAA to AA- instead would increase the costs by 6.1% of the MRO 
(coefficient  AA γ  in the table), while a deterioration from AAA to A would require a credit risk 
                                                 
14 We also tried to use ratings from Moody’s, a different rating agency. The results are qualitatively similar, although 
with Moody’s ratings the coefficients associated to the AA and AA- rating dummies turned out to be lower than 
that associated to the AA+ rating dummy. 
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Table 5 shows that the coefficients associated to the rating dummies are now all monotonically 
increasing. Comparing the point estimates of tables 4 and 5, we see that the elimination of the 
From table 5, we can derive estimates of the liquidity and credit risk premiums discussed before.                                     
premium equal to 7.6% of the MRO (coefficient  − AA γ  in the table). It is worthwhile to emphasise 
that all these estimates are highly statistically significant and the R
2 of the regression is very high. 
The large debt-to-GDP ratios of most euro area countries imply that these results are bound to be 
the additional costs due to liquidity and credit risk premiums at the current interest rate levels, 
assuming it applies instantaneously to all debt. 
 AT  BE  ES  FI  FR  GR  IE  IT  NL  PT 
Debt/GDP  2005 64 94 46 43 66  112  31  105  58 62 
Liquidity  premium 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.11 0.06 0.07 
Credit  premium  0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.09 
 rating (S&P) 
AAA  AA+  AAA  AAA  AAA  A  AAA  AA-  AAA  AA- 
 
For example, the current liquidity risk premium would cost France about 0.07% of the French 
GDP. Belgium pays an extra credit risk premium for its AA+ rating roughly equal to 0.11% of its 
introduction of the euro are therefore both statistically and economically significant in the long 
run.  
 
Figure 2 plots the time-varying risk premiums decomposition. The behaviour of the risk 
premiums follows very closely that of the MRO because, according to the model, both liquidity 
and credit risk premiums should be proportional to the level of interest rates.  
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not only statistically significant, but also economically relevant. Table 6 reports the estimates of 
Table 6 – Additional costs for governments (in percentage of GDP) due to risk premiums 
PM: Mid-2006
GDP. In the case of Italy, its AA- credit rating costs its government about 0.16% of its GDP 
more than if it had a perfect rating. The consequences of a rating downgrading after the                                     





























































































Liquidity Premium Credit Premium (AA) Credit Premium (AA-) Credit Premium (A)  
 
According to our estimates, most of the spreads observed in the euro area government bond 
market are due to credit risk. At the same time, the presence of a positive liquidity risk premium 
suggests that there is room for further integration in this market.   
 
4.1 Robustness checks 
To place the above results in perspective, we run a series of robustness checks. We first look at 
data on credit default swaps, which provide a direct measure of the credit risk premium as 
perceived by markets. Then we look at the behaviour of spreads in the euro area corporate bond 
market, and finally, we study the US corporate bond spreads. 
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a. Credit Default Swaps 
In a Credit Default Swaps (CDS) contract, the protection buyer makes periodic payments to the 
protection seller until the contract expires or the credit event occurs. In return, the seller promises 
to buy the defaulted bond at its par value, should the underlying firm or country default on its 
debt. CDS – by providing a direct and absolute measure of the default risk of a bond – permit to 
circumvent the problem of credit rating definitions in order to disentangle the liquidity and 
default components of the spread.  
A serious limitation of this instrument in the context of the government bond market is its low 
market liquidity. This implies that reliable data are available only for the very recent time span 
and not for all euro area countries. This prevents a comprehensive, long-term analysis of spread 
dynamics. Nevertheless, the available data can be used to cross-check our previous results of the 
panel regression analysis. 
In figure 3, we report the differences between Greek, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish CDS rates 
over the French ones.
15 The source is Bloomberg, which provide data only for these euro area 
countries, starting from July 2004. 
                                                 
15 Even AAA bonds have a risk – albeit small – of default. Since we want to measure the credit risk premium paid in 
excess of the AAA bond, we take differences between CDS rates on non-benchmark and benchmark bonds. Since 
data on Germany are not available, we use France as its closest substitute. 
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IT (AA-) ES (AAA) GR (A) PT (AA)  
 
A few remarks are necessary before commenting on the chart. Portuguese bonds were 
downgraded from AA to AA- in July 2005, while the Italian credit outlook was downgraded from 
stable to negative in August 2005. In addition, mid-2005 was the time of concluding the revised 
Stability and Growth Pact, and of the rejection of the Constitution for Europe by the French and 
Dutch population. These facts together explain the jump in Portuguese, Italian and Greek CDS 
rates that occurred in summer 2005. The fact that CDS on AAA Spanish bonds are not always 
equal to the French ones may be due to differences in their liquidity, but partly confirms that 
credit risk may vary within the same rating category. Obviously, with the credit ratings used in 
the panel regression, we cannot have the same granularity that can be obtained from the CDS 
data.  
It is reassuring, however, that a cross-checking of the results gives a consistent picture. According 
to figure 3, the credit risk premium for AA- rated bonds should be around 10 basis points (as can 
be seen from the Italian CDS before summer 2005 and the Portuguese CDS after summer 2005). 
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This figure is very close to the estimated credit risk premium associated to AA- bonds reported in 
figure 2, which between July 2004 and December 2005 was around 12 basis points.  
Similarly for Greece, CDS data suggest a credit risk premium oscillating between 10 and 20 basis 
points, while the estimates from figure 2 indicate an estimated credit risk premium associated to 
A ratings equal to 15 basis points for the period 2004-2005 and raising to about 20 basis points in 
the last few months of the sample. 
 
b. Euro area corporate bonds 
It is sometimes argued that the low spreads observed in the euro area government bond markets 
reflect the non-credibility of the “no bail-out” clause. To the extent that ratings across different 
asset classes are comparable, a strategy to test the validity of this proposition is to estimate an 
analogous panel regression on euro area corporate bond spreads. Since corporate bonds are not 
subject to any bailing-out, the credit risk premium in these markets should be free from this 
distortion. Similar credit premiums estimates in government and corporate bond markets can be 
therefore interpreted as evidence against the non-credibility of the no bail-out clause. 
We used indices from Datastream for 7 to 10 year corporate bonds for three rating categories, 
AAA, AA and A. We used the corresponding index for 7 to 10 year euro area government bonds 
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AAA AA A MRO  
 
We observe an overall pattern similar to the one seen in figure 1 for the euro area government 
bonds. Spreads tend to follow the overall level of interest rates, with high levels in 2000-2001 and 
lower levels towards the end of the sample. The spikes between 2002 and 2003 occurred in the 
aftermath of the ENRON and other corporate scandals that shook the financial world, and reflect 
a temporary change in the risk assessment of the corporate bond market. That spreads between 
AAA and AA categories cross in the second half of the sample is due to the fact that some of the 
bonds in the AAA index were kept in the index even though they were expected to be 
downgraded (and some of the AA to be upgraded). 
Spreads of corporate bonds are, as expected, slightly higher than those on government bonds of 
comparable ratings. This may be explained by the relatively higher liquidity of government bond 
markets. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that governments may be perceived as safer than any 
other asset class due to its taxing-capability.  
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high, except for the AAA bonds which may have suffered most from the corporate scandals 
effect. 
 AAA  AA  A 
MRO 0.26  0.85  0.88 
 
The close relationship between spreads and interest rate levels is further confirmed by the panel 







(.00)  0.88 
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Table 7 – Correlations between 10-year euro corporate spreads and MRO 
Table 8 - Regression coefficient estimates for 10-year corporate spreads 
Table 7 shows that correlation coefficients between the individual spreads and MRO are also very 
regression estimates, reported in table 8.                                     

































































































































Liquidity Premium Credit Premium (AA) Credit Premium (A)  
higher than the corresponding premium observed in the government bond market: the estimated 
AAA γˆ  for the corporate bond market is twice the estimates for the government bond market. The 
credit risk premium associated to the AA rating category is instead of a similar magnitude of that 
estimated for the government bonds, lying between the risk premiums associated to the AA and 
AA- government bonds.  
There is instead discrepancy between the estimated risk premiums associated to the A rating, with 
credit risk premiums in the corporate bond sector being about twice as big as those in the 
government bond market. This may be due to supply/demand factors specific to the Greek 
government market (the only A rated government in our sample), to accounting and regulatory 
practices (such as the special status of government bonds in the capital requirements in the Basel 
accord), to the fact that for the same rating category corporate bonds may be perceived as riskier 
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Comparing tables 8 and 5, we can see that – as expected – the liquidity premium tends to be                                     
than government bonds, as well as it may be a sign that markets are discounting that the “no bail-
out clause” is not fully credible. 
 
c. US corporate bonds 
As a final robustness check, we look at the behaviour of spreads in the US corporate bond market. 
In figure 6 we plot the spreads of 7-10 year US corporate bond indices relative to the 
corresponding Treasury index, for three rating categories. In the same figure, we plot for 
reference also the federal funds rate. 
































AAA AA A FedFund  
US corporate spreads are characterised by similar behaviour as the euro area corporate spreads. 
We confirm the overall positive relationship between spreads and interest rate levels, as well as 
the spread volatility induced by the corporate scandals between 2001 and 2003. 
32
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 745 
April 2007                                    
Rate are also very high, although less than the European ones. 
 AAA  AA  A 
FFR 0.57  0.69  0.61 
 
The close relationship between spreads and interest rate levels is further confirmed by the panel 
Table 10 - Regression coefficient estimates for 10-year corporate spreads 







(.018)  0.37 
 
The estimated coefficients associated to the rating dummies are lower than the corresponding 
2
with respect to the euro area corporate bond market. These results, however, generally support the 
existence of a robust and positive relationship between short term interest rates and bond spreads.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
This paper has analysed the relationship between financial integration, market discipline and 
fiscal rules in the context of the euro area government bond market. 
We have argued that financial integration is a necessary condition for market discipline: the more 
developed and integrated the financial markets are, the higher the degree of market efficiency and 
the more accurate government bonds are priced. Nevertheless, lower interest rate spreads in the 
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Table 9 – Correlations between 10-year US corporate spreads and Fed Funds 
Table 9 shows that correlation coefficients between the individual spreads and the Federal Funds 
regression estimates, reported in table 10. 
estimates for the euro area corporate bond market. The lower R  and the lower correlations shown 
in table 10 suggest that spreads in US corporate bond market may be driven by additional factors                                     
run-up to EMU and after have given rise to the idea that financial market integration has resulted 
in less market discipline. The key factor in explaining this is the exchange rate risk that reduced 
over time and was completely eliminated as of 1999. 
Given sometimes slow and limited financial market reactions to fiscal derailments, market 
discipline needs to be complemented by fiscal rules. In the context of the euro area, the Stability 
and Growth Pact provides guidance and a common language to financial markets, and thereby 
reinforces its operation. It is the compound effects of market discipline and fiscal rules – by 
increasing the overall costs of fiscal indiscipline – that increases the incentives for governments 
to promote sound fiscal policies.  
The paper has finally provided an empirical analysis on the determinants of spreads in the euro 
area government bond market. An important finding of our analysis is that spreads tend to be 
driven by the level of short-term interest rates. In addition, we find that sovereigns with lower 
credit ratings are forced to pay a higher credit risk premium, which is confirmed by various 
robustness checks. Thus, we find evidence of market discipline still operating in EMU. Part of the 
current interest rate spreads therefore will continue to prevail as long as not all countries have 
achieved fiscal sustainability, regardless of the state of financial integration. We have also 
documented the existence of a positive liquidity risk premium, suggesting there is further scope 
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